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Abstract
We give a generic divide-and-conquer approach for construct-
ing collusion-resistant probabilistic dynamic traitor tracing
schemes with larger alphabets from schemes with smaller al-
phabets. This construction offers a linear tradeoff between the
alphabet size and the codelength. In particular, we show that
applying our results to the binary dynamic Tardos scheme of
Laarhoven et al. leads to schemes that are shorter by a factor
equal to half the alphabet size. Asymptotically, these code-
lengths correspond, up to a constant factor, to the fingerprinting
capacity for static probabilistic schemes. This gives a hierarchy
of probabilistic dynamic traitor tracing schemes, and bridges
the gap between the low bandwidth, high codelength scheme
of Laarhoven et al. and the high bandwidth, low codelength
scheme of Fiat and Tassa.
1 Introduction
In this day and age of digital technology, protecting digital data
from unauthorized copying and redistribution is an increasingly
relevant problem. By embedding unique and imperceptible fin-
gerprints in each copy of the content, distributors of digital con-
tent can trace pirated copies to the pirate. However, a more dif-
ficult scenario arises when several users who have purchased
a copy collude to form a coalition. When receiving their fin-
gerprinted content, colluders can compare their copies to detect
parts of the fingerprints: with the content being the same for all
colluders, the differences they detect must be part of the finger-
prints. Then, just assigning unique fingerprints to each user is
not sufficient anymore, as the colluders may output a forgery
that does not match any of their copies exactly. For this, we
need collusion-resistant traitor tracing schemes, consisting of a
way to assign fingerprints to users, and an algorithm to trace a
forged copy to the colluders.
1.1 Model
Several models have been considered for this fingerprinting
game. We will focus on the restricted digit model, where for
each segment of the content, colluders always output one of
their fingerprinted segments. This means that if, in some seg-
ment, all colluders receive the same fingerprint, they are forced
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to output this version of the content. In the literature, this is usu-
ally called the marking condition or marking assumption. De-
pending on the application, we also consider two different types
of schemes. In static schemes, for each user, the distributor
generates all fingerprinted segments at once. After the pirates
generate a forged copy of the whole content, the accusation al-
gorithm has to trace this single forged copy to the colluders. In
this scenario, it is impossible to guarantee that all colluders are
caught, so we only require that at least one colluder is caught.
In dynamic schemes however, the content owner is more power-
ful, as after every single content segment he can try to catch and
disconnect pirates, and adjust the fingerprints for the next seg-
ments based on the previous pirate output. When a colluder is
disconnected, he no longer receives content, and we assume the
other colluders continue outputting watermarked content. With
dynamic schemes we are therefore able to catch all colluders,
so we only say a dynamic scheme is successful if all colluders
are traced. For static schemes, think of DVDs and CDs, while
the dynamic setting applies to pay-tv and other live broadcasts.
A further classification of the schemes depends on the notion
of security we want the scheme to achieve. For probabilistic
schemes we demand that (i) with probability at most ε1 one or
more of the innocent users are caught, and (ii) with probability
at most ε2 we do not catch any colluder (static schemes) or all
colluders (dynamic schemes). For deterministic schemes, we
demand that ε1 = ε2 = 0.
1.2 Notation
For convenience, we introduce some more notation. We write
C for the set of colluders, and denote the number of colluders
by c = |C|. We write U for the set of all users, and we de-
note its size by n = |U |. For each segment i, at most q different
robust versions can be generated. We denote these by the alpha-
bet Q = {0, 1, . . . , q−1}. We denote the number of successive
segments that the scheme needs by the codelength ℓ. We put
the fingerprints in a matrix X , where each row corresponds to
a user j and each column to a segment i. To avoid confusion,
throughout the paper we will consequently reserve j for index-
ing users and i for indexing positions or segments. After the
code matrix X is generated, the colluders get together to form
a pirated copy ~y, which due to the marking condition satisfies
yi ∈ {Xj,i : j ∈ C}. Then, the distributor detects this pirate
output, and uses some tracing algorithm σ on the pirate output
~y and code matrix X to accuse a set of users C′ = σ(~y) ⊆ U .
A probabilistic scheme is then successful if P (C′ 6⊆ C) ≤ ε1,
and P (C′∩C = ∅) ≤ ε2 (static schemes) or P (C 6⊆ C′) ≤ ε2.
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1.3 Related work
The results in this work are related to probabilistic dynamic
traitor tracing schemes, but we will also compare our results
with other dynamic or probabilistic schemes. Fiat and Tassa [7]
describe a deterministic dynamic scheme, using an alphabet of
size q = 2c+1 and achieving a codelength of ℓ = c log2 n+ c.
Since any deterministic (dynamic) scheme requires the use of
an alphabet of size q ≥ c + 1, Berkman et al. [1] then investi-
gated whether with q = c + 1 one could also efficiently catch
all colluders. They showed that this can be done with a code-
length of ℓ = O(c2 + c log2(n)). In the area of probabilistic
static schemes, the scheme of Boneh and Shaw [4] was the first
breakthrough, achieving a codelength polynomial in the num-
ber of colluders, with an alphabet size of q = 2. A further im-
provement was given by Tardos [15], who constructed a binary
(q = 2) scheme achieving codelengths ℓ = 100c2⌈ln(n/ε1)⌉.
This scheme is widely known as the Tardos scheme. Several
papers [2, 13, 14] then showed how the constant 100 can be fur-
ther reduced, and Laarhoven and De Weger [10] finally showed
how to achieve the optimal codelength of the binary symmet-
ric Tardos scheme, given by ℓ = (pi
2
2 +O(c
−1/3))c2 ln(n/ε1).
Building upon this optimal static Tardos scheme, Laarhoven et
al. [11] showed how to construct an efficient binary dynamic
Tardos scheme, which has the same asymptotic codelength (for
c→∞) as the optimal static Tardos scheme, but is able to catch
all colluders with high probability. This scheme improved upon
the earlier scheme of Tassa [16], which uses codelengths quartic
in c.
Besides constructions of traitor tracing schemes, several pa-
pers have also investigated theoretical bounds on the codelength
needed to catch a certain number of colluders. So far, these
have all focused on probabilistic static schemes. Tardos [15]
showed that his codelength is optimal up to a constant factor.
Huang and Moulin [9] gave the exact capacity of the binary
fingerprinting game, by showing that for large c, a codelength
of ℓ = 2 ln(2)c2 ln(n/ε1) is both necessary and sufficient. This
was then extended to the q-ary setting independently by Boesten
and ˇSkoric´ [3] and Huang and Moulin [8], showing that the q-
ary capacity corresponds to 2 ln(q) c
2
q−1 ln(n/ε1) bits of infor-
mation, or a codelength of ℓ = 2 ln(2) c
2
q−1 ln(n/ε1) symbols
from a q-ary alphabet.
1.4 Contributions and outline
In this paper, we give a generic divide-and-conquer approach
for constructing probabilistic dynamic traitor tracing schemes
with large alphabets from schemes with small alphabets. This
construction provides a linear tradeoff between the alphabet
size q and the codelength ℓ; increasing the alphabet size by a
factor k leads to codes that are a factor k shorter. This construc-
tion can be applied to any low-bandwidth probabilistic dynamic
traitor tracing scheme, and in particular to the (binary) dynamic
Tardos scheme of Laarhoven et al. [11]. We show that for ar-
bitrary alphabet sizes q, we obtain schemes with codelengths
ℓ = (π2 + O((c/q)−1/3 + (c ln( qε2 )/q)
−1/2)) c
2
q ln(n/ε1),
matching the fingerprinting capacity for static q-ary traitor trac-
ing schemes up to constant factors. Letting q = O(c1−γ)
for some γ > 0, we get asymptotic codelengths of ℓ =
(π2 + O(c−γ/3))c1+γ ln(n/ε1), improving upon the code-
lengths (and alphabet size) of Berkman et al. [1] for large c. As
γ → 0, these codelengths also approach the asymptotic code-
lengths of Fiat and Tassa [7].
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we
describe the divide-and-conquer technique to build schemes
with larger alphabets from schemes with smaller alphabet sizes.
Then, in Section 3, we apply the results to the binary dynamic
Tardos scheme to obtain an efficient q-ary dynamic Tardos
scheme, and we compare our results with previous results from
the literature. Finally, in Section 4, we give a brief summary
and discussion of the results, and we mention some directions
for future research.
2 Construction
First, let us assume that for a given alphabet size q0, we have
some construction mechanism Sq0 for generating q0-ary dy-
namic traitor tracing schemes (consisting of a code X and a
tracing algorithm σ) for any given maximum number of collud-
ers c, total number of users n, and for given upper bounds ε1
and ε2 on the false positive and false negative error probabili-
ties respectively. Now, to efficiently combat collusion attacks
with an alphabet of size q = 2q0, we follow a two-stage pro-
cess. First, we divide (see Subsection 2.1) the colluders in two
groups of roughly equal size, and generate q0-ary traitor tracing
schemes for each group separately. Then we show how to com-
bine these codes, such that we can conquer (see Subsection 2.2)
the whole coalition using short q-ary codes. Finally, in Subsec-
tion 2.3 we show how to generalize this approach to arbitrary
divisions, where q = kq0 for some k ≥ 2.
2.1 Divide
Before we even start thinking about traitor tracing schemes, we
consider the following problem: How can we divide the set of
usersU in two groupsU (1), U (2), such that each group contains
the same number of colluders? Since we have no idea which of
the users are the colluders, it is impossible to always do this cor-
rectly. However, if we allow some room for error, this problem
can be solved quite easily. Assuming n is even, we first ran-
domly divide the set of users U in two groups U (1) and U (2) of
size n/2. Let the number of colluders in each group be denoted
by C(t), for t = 1, 2. Then, the number of colluders C(1) in
U (1) follows a hypergeometric distribution, i.e., we are taking
n/2 samples from a population of size n with c successes with-
out replacement. To prove that both groups contain roughly the
same number of colluders, note that maxt=1,2 C(t) > c/2 + a
if and only if |C(1) − c/2| > a. To bound the probability of
the latter event, we apply a result of Chva´tal [6], which is very
similar to Chernoff’s bound [5] for estimating tail probabilities
of binomial distributions. For arbitrary values of a > 0, we get
P
(
C(1) >
c
2
+ a
)
≤ e−2a
2/c. (1)
Furthermore, by symmetry we have P (|C(1) − c2 | > a) =
2P (C(1) > c2 + a). So for any ε2 > 0 and α2 =
√
ln 4ε2 ,
we can take a = α2
√
c
2 to get
P
(
max
t=1,2
C(t) >
c
2
+ α2
√
c
2
)
≤
ε2
2
.
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Hence, each group contains n/2 users in total, and with prob-
ability at least 1 − ε22 each group contains at most
c
2 + α2
√
c
2
colluders.
After splitting the users in groups, for each group t = 1, 2,
we independently generate a q0-ary dynamic traitor tracing
scheme (X(t), σ(t)), using Sq0 . For each scheme, we use a dif-
ferent set of q0 symbols, e.g., the symbols Q(1) = {0, . . . , q0 −
1} for U (1), and Q(2) = {q0, . . . , q − 1} for U (2). The param-
eters to use for generating these schemes are given below:

c(t) =
c
2
+ α2
√
c
2
, ε
(t)
1 =
ε1
2
,
n(t) =
n
2
, ε
(t)
2 =
ε2
4
.

 (t = 1, 2)
Here, c(1) is the number of colluders the scheme forU (1) should
be resistant against, etc. This leads to two code matrices X(1,2)
with respective codelengths ℓ(1,2), and two tracing algorithms
σ(1,2).
2.2 Conquer
Having finished the preprocessing, we now show how to weave
the two q0-ary codes X(1,2) and tracing algorithms σ(1,2) into a
single q-ary codeX and tracing algorithm σ. We start by setting
i = i(1) = i(2) = 1, where i denotes the current position in the
code X , and i(1,2) denote the current positions in X(1,2).
Now, at each position i and for both t = 1, 2, we send to
each user j ∈ U (t) his ith symbol Xj,i = X(t)j,i(t) ∈ Q
(t)
. If
i(t) > ℓ(t), we expect to have caught all colluders in group U (t)
already, so we then assign all active users in U (t) the empty
fingerprint, denoted by λ.
Then, after sending the ith symbols to all users, the coalition
chooses an output symbol yi. The distributor then detects this
forgery, and does the following.
• If yi ∈ Q(1), we apply σ(1) to yi and the users in U (1).
This may involve calculating accusation scores, discon-
necting users etc. For users in U (2), nothing happens.
When this is done, we increase i(1) by 1.
• If yi ∈ Q(2), we apply σ(2) to yi and the users in U (2).
For users in U (1), we do not do anything. Afterwards, we
increase i(2) by 1.
• If yi = λ, we terminate, and we say the scheme has failed.
Finally, we increase i by 1 and we start with sending the new
round of symbols to the users. This continues until either
i > ℓ(1) + ℓ(2), or no pirate output is detected anymore and all
colluders are caught. Theorem 1 tells us that when the scheme
terminates, with high probability we will be in the latter sce-
nario. Before we state the theorem, we will illustrate the con-
struction with an example.
Example 1. Let U = {1, . . . , 8} and Q = {0, . . . , 3}, and
suppose we want to find the (hidden) coalition C = {1, 3, 7, 8}
of size c = 4. First, we divide the group of users into two
groupsU (1) = {1, . . . , 4} and U (2) = {5, . . . , 8}, and we hope
each group now contains 2 colluders. Next, we use a construc-
tion mechanism S2 which allows us to generate binary dynamic
traitor tracing schemes for c = 2 for each group, resulting in
the following codes X(1,2) of length ℓ(1,2) = 5:
X(1) =


0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0

 , X(2) =


2 2 3 2 2
3 2 2 3 3
3 3 3 3 2
2 3 2 2 3

 .
We are now ready to conquer the coalition. One by one we
send the symbols, and respond to the coalition as described in
Section 2.2. This leads to the following code matrix X and
pirate output y.
X =


0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 −
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 λ
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 −
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 λ
2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 λ λ λ
3 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 λ λ λ
3 3 3 3 − − − − − − −
2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 − − −


y =
(
3 0 3 3 1 1 2 3 0 1 −
)
The dashes represent disconnected users. In this case, at the
end all four colluders have been caught and no innocent users
were harmed in the process. Note that the bold half-columns,
corresponding to segments i where the pirate output yi is a sym-
bol from that half of the alphabet, together form the codes X(1)
and X(2).
Theorem 1. Let the q-ary traitor tracing scheme be constructed
as described earlier. Then, with probability at most ε1 at least
one innocent user is caught, and with probability at most ε2
not all pirates are disconnected after at most ℓ = ℓ(1) + ℓ(2)
segments.
Proof. First, note that for innocent users, nothing really
changes compared to the original q-ary scheme. For innocent
users j ∈ U (t) (for some t = 1, 2) and positions i where
yi /∈ Q(t), the accusation algorithm does not do anything, so
we only have to consider the positions i where yi ∈ Q(t). On
these positions, we use the algorithm σ(t) as in the original q0-
ary scheme. But for the original scheme we know that if we
use at most ℓ(t) symbols, the probability that no innocent users
in group t are accused is at least 1 − ε(t)1 . So the probability
that none of the innocent users in any group is disconnected is
at least (1 − ε(1)1 )(1− ε
(2)
1 ) ≥ 1− ε1, as was to be shown.
For guilty users, we also use a reduction-argument to prove
that with high probability, all colluders are caught. First, with
probability at least 1− ε22 the number of colluders in each group
is bounded from above by c2 +α2
√
c
2 . If this is indeed the case,
then the analysis of the original schemes tells us that after at
most ℓ(t) positions, with probability at least 1− ε24 all colluders
in any one of these groups is caught. Since at each segment,
either i(1) or i(2) increases, at some point one of them, say i(t),
will exceed ℓ(t). Then we know that we will have caught all
colluders with probability at least 1 − ε24 . So the only remain-
ing active colluders are in the other group U (t′), for which we
also know that with probability at least 1− ε24 we will catch all
colluders before i(t′) exceeds ℓ(t′). So with probability at least
(1− ε22 )(1−
ε2
4 )
2 ≥ 1− ε2, the division and both schemes are
successful, and we will catch all pirates after at most ℓ(1)+ ℓ(2)
symbols.
It follows that if we have a construction mechanism Sq0 that
produces schemes with codelengths ℓq0(c, n, ε1, ε2) quadratic
in c and logarithmic in n, ε−11 , ε−12 , then the divide-and-conquer
technique provides us with q-ary schemes (with q = 2q0)
achieving codelengths of
ℓq(c, n, ε1, ε2) = 2ℓq0
(
c
2
+ α2
√
c
2
,
n
2
,
ε1
2
,
ε2
4
)
≈ 2ℓq0
( c
2
, n, ε1, ε2
)
≈
1
2
ℓq0(c, n, ε1, ε2).
The first approximation follows from c2 +O(
√
c
2 ) ≈
c
2 . So the
codelength decreases by a factor of approximately 2, while the
alphabet size increases by the same factor 2.
2.3 Arbitrary divisions
For simplicity, and for explaining the divide-and-conquer tech-
nique, in Subsection 2.1 we divided the set of users in 2 groups
of roughly equal size. This can easily be generalized to split-
ting the users in k ≥ 2 groups. For simplicity, let us assume that
both n and q are divisible by k, and that q = kq0 for some q0.
Let us denote the random variable describing the distribution of
colluders among the groups by a vector ~C = (C(1), . . . , C(k)),
with C(t) being the number of colluders assigned to groupU (t).
Then, for each t, the random variable C(t) follows a hypergeo-
metric distribution with mean ck and variance less than
c
k .
Similar to the fact that the tails of the hypergeometric distri-
bution are smaller than the tails of the binomial distribution, it
can be shown that the probability that max1≤t≤k C(t) exceeds
some value a is smaller than the probability that the maximum
entry max1≤t≤kM (t) of a uniform multinomial random vari-
able ~M = (M (1), . . . ,M (k)) exceeds the same value a. This
allows us to apply a result from Raab and Steger [12, Theorem
1], which says that for values k such that k ln k = o(c), this
maximum max1≤t≤k M (t) is always very close to its mean ck .
More precisely, for αk = O
(√
ln kε2
)
for some ε2 > 0, with
high probability the group with the largest number of colluders
will not contain more than ck + αk
√
c
k colluders:
P
(
max
1≤t≤k
C(t) >
c
k
+ αk
√
c
k
)
≤
ε2
2
.
So after splitting the users in k groups of size nk , we know that
with probability at least 1 − ε22 each group contains at most
c
k + αk
√
c
k colluders. Then, for each group we independently
generate q0-ary traitor tracing schemes (X(t), σ(t)) using Sq0 ,
with parameters

c(t) =
c
k
+ αk
√
c
k
, ε
(t)
1 =
ε1
k
,
n(t) =
n
k
, ε
(t)
2 =
ε2
2k
.

 (t = 1, . . . , k)
The probability that the splits go well and the tracing of traitors
in each group goes well, is at least (1− ε22 )(1−
ε2
2k )
k ≥ 1− ε2.
The conquer-phase can then analogously be generalized to k
groups, weaving k codes X(t) together to a big code X . We
then end up with a q-ary traitor tracing scheme with the follow-
ing properties.
Theorem 2. Let the q-ary traitor tracing scheme be as de-
scribed above. Then, with probability at most ε1 at least one
innocent user is caught, and with probability at most ε2 not all
pirates are disconnected after at most ℓ =∑kt=1 ℓ(t) segments.
So if we can construct q0-ary schemes with codelengths
ℓq0(c, n, ε1, ε2) quadratic in c, then the divide-and-conquer
technique provides us with q-ary schemes (q = kq0) with code-
lengths
ℓq(c, n, ε1, ε2) = kℓq0
(
c
k
+ αk
√
c
k
,
n
k
,
ε1
k
,
ε2
2k
)
≈ kℓq0
( c
k
, n, ε1, ε2
)
≈
1
k
ℓq0 (c, n, ε1, ε2) .
So the codelength decreases by a factor of approximately k,
while the alphabet size increases by the same factor k. In par-
ticular, using a binary scheme with a codelength of ℓ2 quadratic
in c as a starting point, we obtain q-ary traitor tracing schemes
with codelengths satisfying
ℓq(c, n, ε1, ε2) ≈
2
q
ℓ2(c, n, ε1, ε2). (2)
Remark
For explaining the divide-and-conquer method, we assumed the
smaller codes X(t) were generated in advance, i.e., during the
divide-phase. This is not necessary, as one could also gener-
ate the new symbols for users on the fly, once they are needed.
In practice, one may not want to generate all codewords in ad-
vance, but let them depend on the previous pirate ouput. Then,
only when yi−1 ∈ Q(t) for some t is known, the distributor
generates new symbols for users j ∈ U (t). This means that
this divide-and-conquer method works for any probabilistic dy-
namic traitor tracing scheme, even when the codewords cannot
be generated in advance.
3 The q-ary dynamic Tardos scheme
Recently, Laarhoven et al. [11] showed that one can efficiently
turn the binary static Tardos scheme [15], or any variant thereof
[13, 2, 10], into a dynamic scheme that is able to catch all col-
luders with a codelength that is quadratic in c. More precisely,
for q = 2 and parameters c, n, ε1, ε2, one can create schemes
(X, σ) with codelengths L2 satisfying
L2(c, n, ε1, ε2) =
[
π2
2
+O
(
3
√
1
c
)]
c2 ln
(
n
ε1
)
. (3)
Note that the codelength does depend on ε2, but ε2 only appears
in lower order terms; see Laarhoven et al. [11] for details. Us-
ing this construction as our ‘base construction’ S2, the divide-
and-conquer construction allows us to construct q-ary dynamic
Tardos schemes with the following codelengths Lq.
Theorem 3. For arbitrary (even) q satisfying q ln q = o(c), we
can construct q-ary dynamic Tardos schemes with codelengths
Lq given by
Lq(c, n, ε1, ε2)
=

π2 +O

 3√q
c
+
√
q log qε2
c



 c2
q
ln
(
n
ε1
)
. (4)
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Proof. Let q = 2k be even. Combining Equation (3) with The-
orem 2, we get
Lq(c, n, ε1, ε2) = kL2
(
c
k
+ αk
√
c
k
,
n
k
,
ε1
k
,
ε2
2k
)
= k
[
π2
2
+O
((
c
k
+ αk
√
c
k
)−1/3)]
·
[
c
k
+ αk
√
c
k
]2
ln
(
n/k
ε1/k
)
Since ln k = o( ck ), we have
√
c
k ln
k
ε2
= o
(
c
k
)
, so the order
term above simplifies to O
(
3
√
k
c
)
. Expanding the square, and
observing that the product of the order-terms is small compared
to the cross-terms, we get
Lq(c, n, ε1, ε2)
=
[
π2
2
+O
(
3
√
k
c
)]
c2
k
+O

c
√
c ln kε2
k



 ln( n
ε1
)
=
[
π2
2
+O
(
3
√
q
c
)]2 +O


√
q ln qε2
c



 c2
q
ln
(
n
ε1
)
=

π2 +O

 3√q
c
+
√
q ln qε2
c



 c2
q
ln
(
n
ε1
)
.
This is exactly Equation (4).
Remark
In Equation (4), the first order term contains two terms. For
small values of q compared to c, the first of these terms O( 3
√
q
c )
dominates, as the third root is larger than the square root term.
However, for q ln q close to O(c) and large q and c, the second
term O
(√
q ln q
ε2
c
)
will start to dominate. So which of these
terms is bigger depends on the relation between q and c.
Asymptotically, the codelengthsLq in Equation (4) are a fac-
tor q/2 shorter than the codelengths of the binary dynamic Tar-
dos scheme. These codelengths also match the static finger-
printing capacity as obtained by Boesten and ˇSkoric´ [3] and
Huang and Moulin [8], up to a constant factor. Since we are
considering a dynamic setting, this does not mean that these
codelengths are optimal, but it does show that converting any q-
ary static Tardos scheme to a q-ary dynamic Tardos scheme via
Laarhoven et al.’s construction [11] will at best lead to the same
asymptotic codelengths. Figure 1 shows variants of the Tar-
dos scheme, and ways to construct them. To construct a q-ary
dynamic Tardos scheme from the optimal binary static Tardos
scheme of Laarhoven and De Weger [10], one has to (i) make
the scheme dynamic, and (ii) go from a binary to a q-ary alpha-
bet. First applying (ii) from ˇSkoric´ et al. [13] and then applying
(i) using the construction of Laarhoven et al. [11] leads to codes
that are a factor O(ln q) · O(1) = O(ln q) shorter. We showed
that first applying (i) using the construction of Laarhoven et
al. [11] and then applying (ii), we get codes that are a factor
O(1) · O(q) = O(q) shorter.
binary static Tardos 
 
O(ln q) [13]

binary dynamic Tardos 
 
O(q) (this work)

q-ary static Tardos q-ary dynamic Tardos
O(1)
[11]
//
Figure 1: Known variants of the Tardos scheme, and a comparison of their
asymptotic codelengths. For static Tardos schemes, current methods to con-
struct q-ary schemes [13] lead to codelengths that are a factor O(ln q) shorter
than binary schemes. For dynamic Tardos schemes, we showed that with the
divide-and-conquer approach, the codelength decreases by a factor of O(q).
From any static Tardos scheme, one can obtain a dynamic Tardos scheme with
the same alphabet size and the same order codelengths [11].
3.1 Large-q asymptotics
Instead of considering the asymptotic behaviour of fixed q and
large c, one could also consider the asymptotic behaviour of
large q and c. For instance, if we let q = O(c1−γ) we get the
following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let q = O(c1−γ) for some γ > 0. Then by
Theorem 3, we can construct q-ary dynamic Tardos schemes
achieving asymptotic codelengths of
Lq(c, n, ε1, ε2) =
[
π2 +O(c−γ/3)
]
c1+γ ln
(
n
ε1
)
. (5)
For γ → 0, we get alphabet sizes q almost linear in c, so it
makes sense to compare this construction to the deterministic
schemes of Fiat and Tassa [7] and Berkman et al. [1]. The opti-
mal scheme of Berkman et al. uses an alphabet size of q = c+1,
and requires a codelength of ℓq(c, n) = O(c2 + c log2 n). For
large c, this scheme therefore requires longer codes and larger
alphabets than the q-ary dynamic Tardos scheme. The scheme
of Fiat and Tassa uses an alphabet of size q = 2c + 1, and re-
quires a codelength of only ℓq(c, n) = c log2 n+c. Our scheme
approaches this asymptotic codelength as γ → 0, but the con-
stants of our scheme are larger, and of course Fiat and Tassa’s
scheme is deterministic. So, if one can afford using an alphabet
of size q = 2c+1, Fiat and Tassa’s scheme is clearly the way to
go, but for lower values of q, the q-ary dynamic Tardos scheme
seems to be the best asymptotic scheme known so far.
3.2 The universal Tardos scheme
Besides the dynamic Tardos scheme, Laarhoven et al. [11, Sec-
tion V] also show how to efficiently catch coalitions of a pri-
ori unknown sizes c, using a variant of the dynamic Tardos
scheme known as the universal Tardos scheme. With slightly
longer codelengths and maintaining multiple accusation scores
per user, one can guarantee that small coalitions are caught
much faster. The divide-and-conquer construction can trivially
be applied to this variant as well. In this case, the practical dif-
ficulty of bounding the number of colluders in each group even
disappears, since the universal Tardos scheme does not require
the distributor to provide values of c anymore. One simply di-
vides the set of users in k groups, and assigns the parameters
(n, ε1, ε2)
(t) = (nk ,
ε1
k ,
ε2
k ) to each group. Then, one can easily
show that the scheme will catch any coalition with a codelength
quadratic in the actual number of colluders.
5
4 Summary
We have shown that with the divide-and-conquer approach, we
can obtain schemes for alphabet sizes q = kq0 which have
codelengths approximately equal to the sum of k times the
codelength of a q0-ary traitor tracing scheme. Applying this
to the binary dynamic Tardos scheme of Laarhoven et al. [11],
this leads to codelengths which are quadratic in the number of
colluders c and decreasing linearly in the alphabet size q. Thus,
the codelengths of this construction match the q-ary static fin-
gerprinting capacity of Boesten and ˇSkoric´ [3] and Huang and
Moulin [8], up to a constant factor. For q growing almost lin-
early in c, the codelengths approach the asymptotic codelengths
of Fiat and Tassa [7], and improve upon the codelengths of
Berkman et al. [1].
There are several interesting open problems for future re-
search in this area. We mention some below.
4.1 The capacity of the dynamic fingerprinting
game
To the best of our knowledge, no one has yet investigated
whether the fingerprinting capacity game can be extended to
the dynamic traitor tracing setting. Above, we compared our
codelengths obtained from the dynamic Tardos scheme to the
static fingerprinting capacity, but it would be more interesting
to be able to compare these codelengths to (bounds on) the dy-
namic capacity. The above construction does make a start in
this direction, by showing that the q-ary dynamic fingerprinting
capacity is at least a factor q/2 higher than the binary dynamic
fingerprinting capacity.
4.2 The q-ary static Tardos scheme
ˇSkoric´ et al. [13] gave a construction for q-ary Tardos codes,
which are roughly a factor O(ln q) shorter than binary Tardos
codes. It would be interesting to see if it is possible to con-
struct q-ary Tardos codes which are a factor O(q) shorter and
approach the q-ary fingerprinting capacity. With the dynamic
Tardos construction of Laarhoven et al. [11] and our current re-
sults, this may then also lead to better dynamic traitor tracing
schemes.
4.3 Application to different schemes
Above we showed that our construction can be applied to the bi-
nary dynamic Tardos scheme, but we can also apply our results
to q0-ary dynamic Tardos schemes, or a completely different
binary dynamic traitor tracing scheme. If someone finds better
binary dynamic schemes, combined with our construction this
would immediately lead to better q-ary dynamic traitor tracing
schemes.
4.4 Variants of the divide-and-conquer con-
struction
One can think of many variants of the divide-and-conquer
scheme, but these seem harder to analyze. For example, instead
of using disjoint sets of symbols for each group, one could let
the different alphabets overlap in a few symbols. Or, instead of
always using the same division of colluders in groups, one may
want to redo the division of users in groups for every position,
or every time a user is disconnected. Analyzing these variants
may lead to further improvements.
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